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I. INTRODUCTION
The regulation of women's sexuality and reproduction is best
approached as a fundamental arena of gender conflict in which women
and men have competed for the control of women's bodies.
Reproduction of the species has traditionally been seen as women's primary
function, to be exercised for the benefit of men or for society as a whole, as
defined by men. The legal treatment of women with respect to reproductive
issues has both reflected and perpetuated that traditional view. One approach
that challenges the hegemony of the traditional view is based on an individual
woman's "right to choose," whether the choice relates to termination of
pregnancy or to medical treatment and personal habits during pregnancy. This
approach is founded upon considerations of liberty and privacy. Another
approach is based on women's right to equality, founded on considerations of
the economic, political, social and overarching cultural contexts in which
women become pregnant, are pregnant, require termination of pregnancies,
carry pregnancies to term, give birth and raise children. This approach may
challenge the hegemony of the traditional view in more fundamental ways than
does the liberty approach, and therefore may be more effective. For the same
reason, it may be more difficult to argue successfully in a society which places
strong emphasis on individual liberty and less emphasis on social equality.
In Canadian Supreme Court reproductive rights cases, arguments based on
equality have been presented with some measure of success. R. v. Sullivan2
is one such case. The issue in Sullivan was whether two women who were
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acting as midwives for a woman whose foetus died during the birth process,
in a manner found to be clearly negligent, should have been convicted of
criminal negligence causing death to a person, criminal negligence causing
bodily harm to the pregnant woman, or neither charge. Although the case has
implications for legalized midwifery, it is most significant in its implications
for the legal (and perhaps constitutional) status of the foetus, and for women's
constitutional rights.
The Women's Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF)3 intervened4 in
Sullivan in the Supreme Court of Canada. The Sullivan argument, because it
illustrates the strong relationship between feminist theory and practice, formed
the core of my presentation at the conference Feminism in the 90s: Bridging
the Gap Between Theory and Practice. The written argument ("factum") in
Sullivan forms the core of this article.
In Parts II and III of this article, I will give some background to the
Sullivan argument, including a description of the process LEAF followed in
developing the argument in consultation with women across the country. The
factum itself is reproduced in Part IV and is followed by a brief comment on
the Supreme Court's eventual decision in the case in Part V.
II. SOME GENERAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms5 came into effect in 1982,
with the implementation of the equality provisions delayed until 1985. The
Charter is both similar to and different from the United States Constitution and
Bill of Rights. It is premised on liberalism and guarantees individual rights as
against the state, but unlike the U.S. documents it also recognizes collective
rights and interests-linguistic, religious, and those of First Nations people.6
Although in some respects the wording is similar to that of the U.S. Bill of
Rights, in others it is very different. Even where the wording is similar (such
as the phrase "equal protection of the law"7) the context may change its
3. LEAF was founded in 1985, at the same time that the equality provisions of the new Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into effect.
4. Intervention means that LEAF filed a written brief (a factum) and presented oral argument at the
hearing. The Supreme Court of Canada has discretion to permit interventions and does permit them where
they may bring to bear a perspective not otherwise available and where they may assist the Court in
resolving the issues before it.
5. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
6. See id. §§ 16-23, 29, 25, 27.
7. Section 15 reads:
(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular,
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex,
age or mental or physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object
the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those
that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex,
age or mental or physical disability.
Id. § 15.
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meaning considerably. Further, the Charter gives explicit permission to the
courts to find that legislation or government practice that/ violates rights
nevertheless constitutes a reasonable limit justifiable in a free and democratic
society! Finally, governments may legislatively restrict or violate most rights
(including liberty and equality) by invoking a special provision in the Charter.'
Sections 7, 15 and 28 of the Charter are of central relevance in the area
of reproductive rights. Section 15 guarantees equality "before and under the
law" and the "equal piotection and equal benefit of the law without
discrimination" based on a number of grounds including race, sex, disability,
age and religion.' Sex equality with respect to all Charter rights is explicitly
guaranteed in section 28." Section 7 guarantees "everyone" the right not to
be deprived of life, liberty or security of the person except in accordance with
the principles of fundamental justice. 2
Prior to the Sullivan case, the Supreme Court had made three decisions
affecting reproductive rights in the post-Charter era. In the first, R. v.
Morgentaler,"3 the Court struck down section 251 of the Criminal Code,' 4
which prohibited abortion unless it was performed in an approved hospital with
the prior approval of a Therapeutic Abortion Committee, based upon the
criterion that the continuation of the pregnancy would be likely to endanger
the life or health of the pregnant woman. This case involved prosecution
against Dr. Henry Morgentaler, a medical practitioner and longtime advocate
of choice on abortion, who had opened abortion clinics in defiance of the law.
On several occasions he had been acquitted by juries of charges under section
251. He argued that the legislation, by greatly restricting access to abortion,
violated women's section 7 guarantee of the right to life, liberty and security
of the person. In its decision in Morgentaler, the Supreme Court struck down
the legislation. The common element in all of the majority Reasons was that
women's right to security of the person was violated by the increased risk to
health from abortions delayed by the legislated constrictions on access.'5
Some majority judges' Reasons also held that women's rights to security of
the person or to liberty are violated by legislative interference with decision-
making about a matter as intimate and important as continuing a pregnancy to
8. Section I reads: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom.s guarantees the rights and freedoms
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in
a free and democratic society." Id. § 1.
9. Section 33 reads:"(1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act
of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate
notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter." Id. § 33.
10. Id. § 15.
11. Section 28 reads:"Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and freedoms referred to
in it are guaranteed equally to male and female persons." Id. § 28.
12. Section 7 reads:"Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right
not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." Id. § 7.
13. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
14. R.S.C. ch. C-34, § 251 (1970) (Can.). Criminal legislation is federal in Canada, under the division
of powers. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1867) § 91(27).
15. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. at 60-70, 105-106, 114-121, 173-175.
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At the time the Morgentaler case was decided, there was only one woman
on the Supreme Court of Canada (the first ever to serve), Madame Justice
Bertha Wilson.' 7 When she articulated, in the Morgentaler case, a feminist
approach to the issue of abortion, it marked a milestone in Canadian law.is
Alone among the judges, she rested her conclusion mainly on the violation of
women's right to liberty, saying:
I would conclude, therefore, that the right to liberty contained in s. 7
guarantees to every individual a degree of personal autonomy over
important decisions intimately affecting their private lives.
The question then becomes whether the decision of a woman to
terminate her pregnancy falls within this class of protected decisions.
I have no doubt that it does. This decision is one that will have
profound psychological, economic and social consequences for the
pregnant woman. The circumstances giving rise to it can be complex
and varied and there may be, and usually are, powerful considerations
militating in opposite directions. It is a decision that deeply reflects the
way the woman thinks about herself and her relationship to others and
to society at large. It is not just a medical decision; it is a profound
social and ethical one as well. Her response to it will be the response
of the whole person.
It is probably impossible for a man to respond, even imaginatively, to
such a dilemma n'ot just because it is outside the realm of his personal
experience (although this is, of course, the case) but because he can
relate to it only by objectifying it, thereby eliminating the subjective
16. See id. Reasons of Dickson C.J. at 56-57 and Reasons of Wilson J., particularly at 170-172.
17. For a time there were three women on the Court: Justices Bertha Wilson, Claire L'Heureux-Dub6,
and Beverley McLachlin. With Madame Justice Wilson's retirement and replacement by Mr. Justice Frank
lacobucci, there remain only two.
18. The emerging feminism of Madame Justice Wilson had an enormous impact in creating a debate
about feminist approaches in the legal profession-not just in the academic world. Although Canadian courts
have not participated in task forces on gender bias as has been done in the United States, beginning with
(and I would say to a considerable extent as a result of) Justice Wilson's Reasons in Morgentaler and her
subsequent public lecture Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?, 28 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 507
(1990), there has been a significant amount of activity around issues of gender equality in the legal
profession and the legal system. At the time of this writing, the Canadian Bar Association has set up a
national committee on the issue, with former Justice Wilson as Chair.
Unfortunately, however, out of the Wilson lecture referred to above grew a debate more or less
centered around the question she posed: "Will women judges make a difference?" The question is
important, but perhaps not the one which either Wilson J. herself or many feminist scholars would have
chosen as central. It may be seen as assuming a monolithic view of "women," and it focuses attention on
the identity of individual decision-makers and their thought processes rather than on the contexts in which
their decisions are made and the people who are subject to the conclusions that they reach. For a more
detailed discussion of issues concerning gender representation in the judiciary, see Isabel Grant and Lynn
Smith, Gender Representation in the Canadian Judiciary, in APPOINTING JUDGES: PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS
AND PRACTICE 57 (Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1991).
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elements of the female psyche which are at the heart of the dilemma.
As Noreen Burrows... has pointed out ... the history of the struggle
for human rights from the 18th century on has been the history of men
struggling to assert their dignity and common humanity against an
overbearing state apparatus. The more recent struggle for women's
rights has been a struggle to eliminate discrimination, to achieve a
place for women in a man's world, to develop a set of legislative
reforms in order to place women in the same position as men. It has
not been a struggle to define the rights of women in relation to their
special place in the societal structure and in relation to the biological
distinction between the two sexes. Thus, women's needs and aspirations
are only now being translated into protected rights. The right to
r tproduce or not to reproduce which is in issue in this case is one such
right and is properly perceived as an integral part of modern woman's
struggle to assert her dignity and worth as a human being.19
The then Chief Justice, Brian Dickson, came to similar conclusions in his
Reasons, but in the context of the security of the person guarantee. He said:
Forcing a woman, by threat of criminal sanction, to carry a foetus to
term unless she meets certain criteria unrelated to her own priorities
and aspirations, is a profound interference with a woman's body and
thus a violation of security of the person. Section 251, therefore, is
required by the Charter to comport with the principles of fundamental
justice.
The parties did not argue Morgentaler on the basis of an equality approach
and LEAF did not fide a brief or make oral submissions at any level of the
courts. Indeed, the Ontario Court of Appeal, from which the Morgentaler
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada came, had concluded that because
access to abortion is a matter that only affects women, it does not raise an
equality issue under section 15 of the Charter.21 This is obviously devastating
to an equality approach in the reproductive rights area and beyond because it
views the equality guarantee as mandating, at most, access for women to what
men want or need. Fortunately, this aspect of the case was not confirmed, nor
was it discussed in the Supreme Court of Canada.'
19. Morgentaler, [19881 1 S.C.R. at 171-72 (citing Noreen Burrows, International Law and Human
Rights: the Case of Women 's Rights, in HUMAN RiGrs: FROM RHETORIC TO REALrrY 80, 81-82 (Tom
Campbell et al. eds., 1986)). For a discussion of the transformative possibilities of feminism with respect
to "liberty," see Hester Lessard, Relationship, Particularity, and Change: Reflections on R. v. Morgentaler
and Feminist Approaches to Liberty, 36 MCGILL L.J. 263 (1991).
20. Id. at 56-57.
21. See R. v. Morgentaler, 22 D.L.R.4th 641, 680-85 (Ont. C.A. 1985).
22. However, it must be noted that in a later case, R. v. Hess, [19901 2 S.C.R. 906, Wilson, J.,
writing the majority Reasons, considered the constitutionality of the former Criminal Code statutory rape
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At the same time that the Morgentaler case was working its way through
the judicial system, challenging the Criminal Code legislation on the basis that
it interfered with the section 7 rights of women, the Borowski case' was
following a parallel track, challenging the same legislation on the basis that
it violated section 7 rights of foetuses. In its Reasons in Morgentaler, the
Supreme Court refrained from deciding whether foetuses might have rights
under section 7 to life, liberty and security of the person, but did hold that
there may be a legitimate governmental interest in protecting foetal life (with
Wilson, J. indicating some attraction to the United States Supreme Court's
trimester approach) such that some legislation limiting abortion rights could
be constitutional. 24 When Borowski reached the Supreme Court, however,
it was dismissed as moot because the legislation in question had been struck
down in Morgentaler and had not been replaced. Borowski was the first
Supreme Court of Canada case in which the equality approach to reproductive
rights was argued (in the LEAF intervention).
The equality approach was next argued in Tremblay v. Daigle.'s The facts
of the case perfectly illustrate the connection between abortion and control of
women's bodies by men. The evidence indicated that Jean-Guy Tremblay,
Chantal Daigle's boyfriend, had insisted that she go off the pill, impregnated
her, battered her during the pregnancy, and then sought an injunction from the
court when she left him and declared her intention to obtain an abortion.26
Mr. Tremblay based his claim on an alleged violation of the rights of the
foetus under the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, 27 asserting
the foetus's rights as its putative father.2' He was successful in obtaining and
section. It provided that it was an indictable offense punishable by imprisonment for life for'a man (himself
over the age of fourteen years) to have sexual intercourse with a female person who was not his wife and
under the age of fourteen years, whatever he believed about her age. Wilson, J. concluded the section did
not violate the guarantee of equality in section 15 of the Charter. She wrote:
Nevertheless, there are certain biological realities that one cannot ignore and that may legitimately
shape the definition of particular offences. In my view, the fact that the legislature has defined
an offence in relation to these realities will not necessarily trigger s. 15(1) of the Charter. I think
few would venture to suggest that a provision proscribing self-induced abortion could be
characterized as discriminatory because it does not apply to men. Such an argument would be
absurd. In my view, s. 15(1) does not prevent the creation of an offence which, as a matter of
biological fact, can only be committed by one of the sexes because of the unique nature of the
acts that are proscribed.
R. v. Hess, [19901 2 S.C.R. 906, 929. Given the Supreme Court's decisions in cases about the meaning
of equality and sex discrimination (in particular, Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd., [19891 1 S.C.R. 1219,
59 D.L.R.4th 321, and Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd., [19891 1 S.C.R. 1252, 59 D.L.R.4th 352, holding
that, respectively, pregnancy discrimination and sexual harassment constitute sex discrimination), Wilson,
J. cannot have meant that all sex-specific provisions necessarily pass constitutional muster. The Hess
decision must be understood as saying that an offence directed at only one sex does not automatically violate
s. 15, leaving open the possibility that it may do so if it affects adversely the situation of the disadvantaged
group within the meaning of the s. 15 jurisprudence. For more detailed discussion of this issue, see William
Black and Isabel Grant, Equality and Biological Difference, 79 Crim. Rep. 3d 372 (1990).
23. Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), 119891 1 S.C.R. 342.
24. Morgentaler, [19881 1 S.C.R. at 182-184.
25. 62 D.L.R.4th 634, 646 (1989)(Can.).
26. Id. at 636-37.
27. R.S.Q. ch. C-12 (1977) (Can.).
28. Daigle, 62 D.L.R.4th at 645-46.
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maintaining the injunction up to the Supreme Court of Canada, which
reconvened on an emergency basis during the summer recess to hear Ms.
Daigle's appeal. In the course of the Supreme Court hearing, it was announced
that Ms. Daigle had already obtained an abortion. The Supreme Court
completed its hearing of the case, allowed Ms. Daigle's appeal and dissolved
the injunction that had been issued. The decision rested upon a relatively
narrow doctrinal point: there was no basis in Quebec law for such an
injunction to be issued since the foetus does not have a right to life under
Quebec law, including the Quebec Charter.29 The broader policy orientation
of the case, however, is revealed in the following statement of the court:
While Anglo-Canadian law is not determinative in establishing the
meaning to be given to general terms in the Quebec Charter it is
instructive to consider the legal status of a foetus in that body of
jurisprudence. It is useful to do so as well to avoid the repetition of the
appellant's experience in the common law provinces.30
Sullivan, then, was argued against this doctrinal backdrop: abortion
unrestricted by criminal law,3" affirmation of the Anglo-Canadian common
law and Quebec civil law principles that legal personhood begins at birth,32
and silence as to the constitutional status of the foetus.33 With respect to the
meaning of "equality" under the Charter, the Court had concluded that the
purpose of the equality rights is connected with the alleviation of comparative
disadvantage as between persons on the basis of the personal characteristics
enumerated in section 15 (sex, race, age, disability, religion, and others) and
other analogous characteristics.34 It had also held that the "larger social,
29. Id. at 651.
30. Id. at 659-60. For an insightful comment, see Donna Greschner, Abortion and Democracy for
Women: A Critique of Tremblay v. Daigle, 35 MCGILL L.J. 633 (1990).
31. Two years after Morgentaler, however, there had been an attempt to recriminalize abortion
defeated only by the narrowest of margins. Bill C-43, An Act Respecting Abortion, 2nd. sess., 34th Parl.,
was defeated by a tie vote in the Senate at the Third Reading, January 31, 1991 (Debates of the Senate,
2nd. sess., 34th Parl., at 5307). It is most unusual for the Canadian Senate, an appointed body, to defeat
legislation sent forward by the House of Commons, the only federal elected body.
The current federal Progressive Conservative government has stated that it will not attempt to introduce
further criminal legislation. Interestingly, the defeat of Bill C-43 resulted from opposition from both pro-
choice and anti-choice forces. Although the federal government tried to present it as a compromise, pro-
choice advocates did not view prima facie criminalization of all abortions with exceptions at physicians'
discretion as a compromise, and anti-choice advocates would not accept potentially permitting abortions
in a wide range of cases unrelated to the "innocence" of the woman-that is, beyond rape and incest
victims. While the defeat of Bill C-43 might be viewed as a victory for women, it was also a victory for
members of the medical profession whose strong opposition was a crucial factor in the Bill's defeat. This
opposition was expressed not only by the medical organizations, but by the large numbers of individual
practitioners presently performing abortions who stated that they would cease to do so because of the risk
of harassment and criminal prosecution flowing from the proposed legislation.
32. Daigle, 62 D.L.R.4th at 663.
33. The Court refrained from deciding the issue, though it was asked to do so in Borowski and in
Daigle.
34. Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, 56 D.L.R.4th 1, 18 (1988) (Can.).
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political and legal context" 35 must be considered in assessing claims of
discrimination, saying:
Accordingly, it is only by examining the larger context that a court can
determine whether differential treatment results in inequality or
whether, contrariwise, it would be identical treatment which would in
the particular context result in inequality or foster disadvantage. A
finding that there is discrimination will, I think, in most but perhaps
not all cases, necessarily entail a search for disadvantage that exists
apart from and independent of the particular legal distinction being
challenged. 6
The socio-political backdrop was also significant in four particular respects.
First, women in British Columbia, the province in which the Sullivan case
arose, were (and still are) unable to use the services of registered and licensed
midwives. Those who assist in home births, such as the one that went wrong
in Sullivan, may be accused of violating the Medical Practitioners Act.37
Home births assisted by midwives, therefore, exist outside the law and attract
some social disapproval. This, of course, creates a disincentive for attendants
at home births to seek outside assistance if they run into difficulty.
Second, there had been efforts by state agencies, although perhaps not to
the same extent as in the United States, to use legal means to control the
conduct-of women during pregnancy, including forcing women to submit to
obstetrical intervention. In British Columbia, child welfare authorities had
attempted (unsuccessfully) to establish through the test case of "Baby R."
(Re)38 that they could "apprehend" a foetus before birth when the pregnant
woman carrying the foetus did not consent to undergo a Caesarian section
surgical procedure. 3" Although cases like Baby R. implicate women's
individual and autonomous decision-making in ways very similar to abortion
cases, it may be easier to see them systemically-that is, as reflecting and
determining women's status and condition in society. These cases appear to
arise most frequently with respect to women of color or women who are
economically or socially disadvantaged,' while the abortion issue in the
abstract is more easily (though inaccurately) characterized as involving already
privileged women who simply want to "have it all." Further, cases such as
35. R. v. Turpin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, 1331.
36. Id. at 1331-32.
37. The Medical Practitioners Act, R.S.B.C. ch. 254, § 72(2)(d) (1979) defines the performance of
midwifery as the practice of medicine. It is an offense to practice medicine if not registered under the Act.
Id. § 72(1).
38. 53 D.L.R.4th 69 (B.C.S.C. 1988).
39. While the judge determined that pre-birth "apprehension" is invalid, the woman in the case had
"consented" to the Caesarian after being told that her foetus was apprehended.
40. Veronika E.B. Kolder, Janet Gallagher & Michael Parsons, Court-Ordered Obstetrical
Interventions, 316 NEW ENo. J. MED. 1192 (1987). For an analysis of the Canadian jurisprudence, see
Isabel Grant, Forced Obstetrical Intervention: A Charter Analysis, 39 U. TORONTO L.J. 217 (1989).
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Baby R. involve something that could happen to men (forcible surgery, being
locked up, being refused food or intoxicants) whereas abortion cases do not.
It requires a greater act of imagination for a man to put himself in the position
of a woman who is pregnant and does not wish to be, than for a man to put
himself in the position of, say, a patient in a hospital who is forced to undergo
medical treatment without consent. Therefore, in the case of forced obstetrical
intervention it is easier to see not only that there is a violation of individual
rights, but also that a class of persons who lack these rights is a dominated and
devalued class.
Third, there are issues about access to abortions and to other reproductive
health services. The existence in Canada of publicly funded universal medical
and hospital care schemes is a relevant factor. Because abortion is a medical
procedure, there is in effect a presumption that abortions, at least when
performed within the context of the ordinary practice of hospital-based
medicine, should be state funded.41 But there are systemic access issues
arising from actions by the medical profession, hospitals, and provincial
governments. Some reproductive rights litigation is aimed at improving access
to reproductive health care, and to meaningful choice about reproduction, both
in the public and private spheres. For example, there are moves to compel
governments to fund abortions in free-standing clinics rather than in hospitals
alone.42
Fourth, there has been some success in obtaining legislative remedies for
pregnant women who suffer discrimination in employment, for example,
through exclusion from coverage under employee disability plans. The
Supreme Court of Canada decision in Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd. ,
establishing that pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination, supports the
proposition that women should not be penalized for being pregnant. The Court
pointed out that society as a whole benefits from women's child-bearing
41. Legislation removing coverage for abortions from the provincial health care scheme was struck
down in British Columbia (although on a narrow procedural ground). See British Columbia Civil Liberties
Ass'n. v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 49 D.L.R.4th 493 (B.C.S.C. 1988). For a fuller discussion
of the effect of the Canadian health care scheme on this issue, see SHEILAH L. MARTIN, CANADIAN
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, WOMEN'S REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH, THE CANADIAN
CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS AND THE CANADA HEALTH ACT (1989).
42. See R. v. Morgentaler, 83 D.L.R.4th 8 (N.S.C.A. 1991) (leave granted to appeal to S.C.C.
October 7, 1991, No. 22578), in which Dr. Henry Morgentaler was charged with 14 counts of performing
unauthorized abortions contrary to provincial legislation which restricted the performance of abortions (and
certain other medical procedures) to approved hospitals and prohibited payment for such procedures under
the Health Services and Insurance Act unless performed in approved hospitals. The legislation was held
to be ultra vires the province since in pith and substance its purpose was criminal law (a matter for the
federal Parliament). See also Everywoman's Health Centre Society (1988) v. Minister of National Revenue,
Federal Court of Appeal, A-129-90, 26 November 1991, Dicary, J.A. (as yet unreported), in which the
Court ordered the federal Minister to reconsider his deemed refusal of charitable tax status to a free-
standing abortion clinic, since the Court held the clinic met the definition of "charitable organization"
required by law.
43. [19891 1 S.C.R. 1219, overruling the Court's own earlier decision in Bliss v. Attorney General
of Canada, [19791 1 S.C.R. 183.
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activities, yet women are customarily expected to bear the entire burden."
Viewing women's reproductive work in this way could have far-reaching
effects. The Court's Reasons were consistent with LEAF's intervention in the
case, which highlighted the circumstances of all women who, in their own
communities, face struggles at every stage in reproduction beginning with
control over sexual access to their bodies, through pregnancy, childbirth, and
childrearing.
III. BACKGROUND TO THE SULLIVAN CASE
A. The Facts
Jewel Voth hired Mary Sullivan and Gloria Lemay to assist her with her
pregnancy and home birth. Neither Ms. Sullivan nor Ms. Lemay had formal
training in midwifery or any formal medical qualifications, although both had
some experience with home births and had done background reading on the
subject.
The Supreme Court of Canada Reasons in the case summarize Ms. Voth's
birth experience this way:
After five hours of second-stage labour, the child's head emerged and
no further contractions occurred. Sullivan and Lemay attempted to
stimulate further contractions but were unsuccessful. Direct pressure
was applied to the uterus, causing soreness to the mother's stomach and
back and some bruising. Approximately 20 minutes later, emergency
services were called and the mother was transported to the hospital.
Within two minutes of arrival, an intern delivered the baby using what
the trial judge characterized as "a basic delivery technique." The child
showed no signs of life and resuscitation attempts were unsuccessful.45
Those concise words do not, of course, capture the horror conveyed by the
transcript evidence of the parents and the two birth attendants describing the
emergence of the face and part of the head of the full term-foetus;" the
attendants' efforts to change Ms. Voth's position and to do everything they
could to complete the birth; the recognition that the face was losing its pink
colour and turning blue; the call to Emergency Services and the arrival of an
ambulance with an attendant of considerable upper-body strength who was
44. Id. at 1243.
45. Sullivan, 63 C.C.C.3d 97, 100 (1991).
46. In developing the argument in the case, LEAF struggled with terminology and concluded that the
terms "baby" and "child" for an entity not yet born were problematic in some ways, while "foetus" was
equally problematic at the stage of full-term birth. The term selected as the least problematic was "full-term
foetus."
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asked to press down on Ms. Voth's abdomen in an attempt to dislodge the full-
term foetus; the trip to the hospital; the delivery by the intern and the
unsuccessful attempts to resuscitate the still-born child.
Sullivan and Lemay were jointly charged with criminal negligence causing
death to the child of Jewel Voth. 7 They were also jointly charged with
criminal negligence causing bodily harm to Jewel Voth.4 s
They were convicted at trial by Judge Jane Godfrey of criminal negligence
causing death to the child on the premise that a full-term foetus in the process
of being born is a "person" within the meaning of section 203 of the Criminal
Code.49 Judge Godfrey based the finding of criminal negligence on the
following conclusions:
First, had this child and mother been transported to hospital even as
late as one o'clock, the child would have lived; secondly, had the
accused possessed the skills of the intern at St. Paul's Hospital, the
child would have lived.50
Judge Godfrey acquitted Sullivan and Lemay on the charge of criminal
negligence causing bodily harm since in her view there was no bodily harm.
In the British Columbia Court of Appeal,- the conviction for criminal
negligence causing death to the child of Jewel Voth was quashed. However,
the acquittal for criminal negligence causing bodily harm was set aside and a
conviction on that charge was entered. The court of appeal held that there was
bodily harm to Ms. Voth since "the child when it is in the birth canal remains
part of the mother, as a matter of law.""
The two women sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada,
arguing that the case would provide an important opportunity for the Court to
47. They were charged with this offence under then § 203 of the Criminal Code, which provided that
"Every one who by criminal negligence causes death to another person is guilty of an indictable offence
and is liable to imprisonment for life." The definition of "person" in the Criminal Code in § 2 was as
follows:
.every one", "person", "owner" and similar expressions include Her Majesty and
public bodies, bodies corporate, societies, companies and inhabitants of counties,
parishes, municipalities or other districts in relation'to the acts and things that they
are capable of doing and owning respectively.
R.S.C. ch. C-34, § 203 (1970)(Can.).
48. They were charged with this offence under the Criminal Code § 204, which provided that "Every
one who by criminal negligence causes bodily harm to another person is guilty of an indictable offence
and liable to imprisonment for ten years." Id. § 204.
49. For text of § 203, see supra note 47. Still, the foetus would not have been a "human being" for
the purpose of a different Criminal Code section, § 206, which read:
(1) A child becomes a human being within the meaning of this Act when it has completely
proceeded, in a living state, from the body of its mother whether or not
(a) it has breathed,
(b) it has an independent circulation, or
(c) the navel string is severed.
Id. § 206.
50. R. v. Sullivan, 31 C.C.C.3d 62, 68 (B.C.S.C. 1986).
51. R. v. Sullivan, 43 C.C.C.3d 65, 80 (B.C.C.A. 1988).
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clarify the law with respect to the status of the foetus. Leave to appeal was
granted, and LEAF was given permission to intervene. Subsequently REAL
(Realistic, Effective and Active for Life) Women, a right-wing, anti-choice
group, applied for and was granted permission to intervene. LEAF was aware,
when considering its position, that the appellants would be arguing that the
foetus is neither a person (so there could be no conviction of criminal
negligence causing death) nor part of the pregnant woman's body (so there
could be no conviction of criminal negligence causing bodily harm). REAL
Women would be arguing that the foetus is a person with a right to life from
the moment of conception. The Attorney General of British Columbia, the
respondent to the appeal, was unlikely to argue a position inconsistent with that
of REAL Women, since the British Columbia government of the day was
headed by a strong opponent of abortion. Indeed, the Attorney General
launched an appeal from the court of appeal's acquittal on the charge of
criminal negligence causing death to the child of Jewel Voth, thereby enabling
the "foetus as person" arguments to be made.52 LEAF therefore considered
it would be the only participant arguing from a feminist perspective of any
kind, and was likely to be the only participant to be arguing forcefully for a
position consistent with choice on abortion and reproductive health care.
B. The Development of LEAF's Argument
LEAF's work on Supreme Court of Canada interventions has traditionally
been done by a collective of academics and practitioners. This tradition
continued in Sullivan with a working group that included legal academics
Christine Boyle, Nitya Duclos, Isabel Grant, Catharine MacKinnon and
myself, practitioner and Chair of LEAF's Legal Committee Mary Eberts, and
LEAF's Director of Litigation Helena Orton. The National Legal Committee
selected Mary Eberts and myself to argue the case."
The Sullivan case was particularly challenging for LEAF for the following
reasons:
(1) Support for midwifery is consistent with women's empowerment and
with access to high-quality health care; yet so is support for a legal system that
imposes criminal sanctions upon negligent assistance with childbirth, whether
by midwives, medical practitioners or anyone else. There was a risk that taking
any position other than that of opposition to conviction in the case would be
construed as lack of support for midwifery, rather than lack of support for two
individual, non-accredited "midwives" who were found, on a solid evidentiary
basis, to have been negligent.
52. The stated reason for bringing this appeal was that a method of convicting the two accused should
be available if the court decided against the Crown on the main appeal. However, the appellants suggested
in argument that the appeal was brought in order to accommodate REAL Women. The Supreme Court in
its Reasons rejected that argument. Sullivan, 63 C.C.C.3d at 105-6.
53. Helena Orton also appeared in the Supreme Court at the hearing.
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(2) The story told in this case was heart-rending, carrying with it the image
of the full-term foetus, partially born but slowly suffocating. The case could
hardly have provided a more difficult platform upon which to argue a pro-
choice position (both with respect to abortion and with respect to reproductive
health care). Yet a conclusion that the foetus is a person for the purposes of
the criminal negligence causing death charge would severely undermine the
pro-choice position.
(3) There has been a tendency for the pro-choice position to be subsumed
in a privacy-autonomy analysis that refuses to talk about the foetus, although
perhaps to a lesser extent in Canada than in the United States. The foetus in
this analysis is sometimes characterized as no more than a part of the woman's
body, no matter what its stage of development. On the other hand, many
women's experiences of pregnancy and childbirth indicate the "part-of-the-
body" characterization is inaccurate and incomplete.
(4) The appellants' position that the foetus is neither a person nor part of
the woman's body but instead an "independent entity" seemed creative, yet
it was highly dangerous to the pro-choice position on abortion and reproductive
health care. The interest of the state or of others in protecting the foetus-as-
independent-entity could be used against the pregnant woman in the same way
as the state's or others' interest in protecting the foetus-as-person.
(5) There was not a great deal of analysis anywhere, and none to be found
in the legal discourse, of the relationships between foetuses and pregnant
women. In other words, pregnant women's experiences of pregnancy had not
informed the development of legal doctrine or theory. Yet the Sullivan case
required resolution of issues presupposing such doctrine and theory.
Before deciding upon the position to take in the argument, the working
group widely circulated a "Consultation Document" in the women's
community, including individual women and organizations involved with
reproductive health issues, feminist academics in law, philosophy and the social
sciences, community organizations and national women's groups. This
document described the issues in the case, set out the kinds of dilemmas
described above and suggested some possible positions LEAF could take in
the case. After circulation of the document, there were meetings with various
groups and individuals, and a consensus was achieved among the working
group as to the position LEAF should take, based upon these consultations.
There were several collective drafting sessions and input from a large number
of persons.
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IV. THE FACTUM
The Factum is set out here verbatim.54 Although signed by the writer and
Mary Eberts as counsel, it is very much a product of a collective drafting
process involving all members of the working group.
54. The factum is presented in its original form; citations conform to Canadian citation style.
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SUPREME COURT OF CANADA















and GLORIA JEAN LEMAY
Respondents
(Accused)
FACTUM OF THE INTERVENER
WOMEN'S LEGAL EDUCATION
AND ACTION FUND
PART I - FACTS
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I. The Appellants were charged with criminal negligence causing death
to a person, namely, "the baby of Jewel Voth" (first count), and criminal
negligence causing bodily harm to a person, namely Jewel Voth (second
count), contrary to sections 203 and 204 respectively of the Criminal Code
(now sections 220 and 221).
II. The criminal proceedings arose from the attendance of the Appellants
in the home of Jewel Voth to assist in the birth of her first child. The precise
event giving rise to the charge was described by the trial judge as "the death
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of a child in the course of a home birth where contractions ceased after the
head was delivered and the two accused were unable to deliver the rest of the
child". She found that "the head was born alive and that the child died when
the accused were unable to complete this delivery".
Reasons for Judgment of Her Honour Judge Godfrey
("Reasons"), Appeal Case, p. 18 and p. 29
III. Her Honour Judge Godfrey found the accused guilty on the first
count, holding that the definition of "person" in section 203 is broad enough
to cover the situation where "the child was alive when the head was born and
died because the accused were unable to complete the birth". She declined to
convict the accused of causing bodily harm to Jewel Voth, who, she says
"miraculously suffered only what in effect would be bruising". However she
states that had she reached the opposite conclusion with respect to the "person"
argument, she would have found the accused guilty of criminal negligence
causing bodily harm to Jewel Voth "because I would have concluded that the
child was a part of Jewel Voth at the time of its death".
Reasons, Appeal Case, pp. 31-32
IV. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge erred in
interpreting the term "person" so as to produce a conviction on the first count.
It entered a conviction on the second count, reasoning that "from the
conclusion that the line of demarcation as a matter of law is live birth, in our
opinion, for the purposes of count 2, the child when it is in the birth canal
remains part of the mother, as a matter of law".
Reasons for Judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal,
Appeal Case, p. 58
V. The Appellants appeal their conviction on the second count and seek
to convince this Honourable Court that neither the trial judge nor the Court
of Appeal was correct. They refer to the foetus in this case as "baby Voth"
and argue that it was neither a person (as found by the trial judge) nor part
of the mother (as concluded by the Court of Appeal). Rather, they argue that
"baby Voth" was "an entity separate and apart from its mother", and had a
"separate existence, in law, in the womb". Accordingly, they argue, they
cannot be convicted of either of the offences with which they are charged.
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Appellants' Factum, paras. 2, 13, 24, 29, 35
VI. Responding to the appeal, the Crown argues that the interpretation
of the word "person" by the Court of Appeal is entirely consistent with all the
leading authorities on the point, and states that the Appellants' position that
the common law recognizes the foetus as an entity separate and apart from the
mother is incorrect. However, the Crown also brings its own appeal against
the decision of the Court of Appeal, raising the issue of whether the Court
erred in holding that a foetus is not a "person" within the meaning of section
203 of the Criminal Code.
Respondent's (Crown's) Factum, paras. 25-26, pp. 13-14
Appellant's (Crown's) Factun, para. 16, p. 5
VII. LEAF has been granted status to intervene in the appeals of both
the Appellants and the Crown. This factum responds to issues raised by both
appeals.
THE FACTS
VIII. In addition to the facts set out by the Appellants and the
clarifications and additions of the Crown, LEAF highlights the following facts:
(a) The trial judge found Ms. Voth to be "an astonishingly precise and
careful witness" and "very reliable in terms of describing what was
going on in her own body...". Ms. Voth made considerable efforts to
provide herself with adequate and sensitive care during her pregnancy.
Mr. Voth's evidence was that if the baby had been delivered safely,
Jewel Voth "would have been happy".
Reasons, Appeal Case, pp. 18-20 and p. 28
(b) Dr. Morrell, the family physician seen by Jewel Voth, noted in the
initial physical examination that she had a narrow sub-pubic arch, but
the trial judge accepted Ms. Voth's evidence that this was never
communicated to her.
Reasons, Appeal Case, p. 19
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(c) The trial judge found that during the pregnancy, the Voths became
"disenchanted" with both Dr. Morrell and the hospital where he had
his privileges. They first decided to stay with the hospital, in spite of
this, so that they could have Dr. Morrell attend the birth. Later, Jewel
Voth tried to discuss the option of a home birth with Dr. Morrell. He
attempted to dissuade her with "a graphic description" of a woman who
had haemorrhaged very badly after delivery and had been saved only
because she was in hospital. The reasons of the trial judge contain no
reference to any other advice on the advantages and disadvantages of
home birth being received from Dr. Morrell. Eventually, Ms. Voth
decided not to have Dr. Morrell attend the birth. The trial judge
attributed this decision to Ms. Voth's reaction to his policy on
episiotomies.
Reasons, Appeal Case, pp. 18-19
(d) The trial judge agreed that the skills offered by a competent midwife
would certainly seem to enhance the birth process for women.
Reasons, Appeal Case, p. 24
(e) The Voths initially hired Mary Sullivan for private pre-natal classes and
as a labour coach for their hospital delivery. While continuing to see
Dr. Morrell for pre-natal visits, Jewel Voth eventually made plans with
Ms. Sullivan to have a home birth.
Reasons, Appeal Case, pp. 18-19
(f) Gloria LeMay was Ms. Sullivan's "teacher" and the two of them
generally operated as a team. The Appellants had no formal training,
and sought therefore to be assessed by the trial judge on a more lenient
standard than that which would be applied to persons with such
training.
Reasons, Appeal Case, p. 30 and p. 23
(g) The Crown at trial advanced three types of "bodily harm" that had
been done to Jewel Voth: pain in the legs from a lengthy period of
squatting, the pain and irritation to her stomach and back from fundal
pressure exerted in an ambulance attendant's attempt to expel the baby,
and a cut made when an episiotomy was started.
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Reasons, Appeal Case, p. 31
(h) The trial judge noted that the ambulance attendant was a "power
lifter", who was pushing as hard as he could on the fundus, and
observed, "It is astonishing that nothing ruptured". Ms. Voth's labour
began at 11:00 p.m. in the evening and the baby's head emerged at
2:00 p.m. the next day. When she was admitted to hospital at least half
an hour after that she was showing "symptoms of exhaustion ... fever
... sunken eyes... volume depletion".
Reasons, Appeal Case, pp. 32 and pp. 12, 21, 30
PART II - ISSUES
IX. In this factum, LEAF deals with the following issues which are
argued by the parties to these appeals:
(a) Does criminal negligence during the process of childbirth causing the
full-term foetus not to be born alive constitute the death of a person
within the meaning of section 203 (now 220) of the Criminal Code?
(b) Does criminal negligence during the process of childbirth causing the
full-term foetus not to be born alive constitute bodily harm to the
woman giving birth, within the meaning of section 204 (now 221) of
the Criminal Code?
X. LEAF will argue, using sections 7, 15, 28 and 1 of the Charter, that:
(a) the foetus is not a "person" within the meaning of section 203 of the
Criminal Code, or any other kind of entity separate from the woman
in whose body it is;
(b) the foetus is in and of the woman for the purposes of section 204 of
the Criminal Code; LEAF thus states that it is a mischaracterization
of the Court of Appeal's reasons to say that it held that the foetus is
"simply a disposable part of the woman's body", as do the Appellants
in paragraph 29 of their factum, and urges this Honourable Court to
reject such mischaracterization; and
(c) Jewel Voth suffered "bodily harm" within the meaning of section 204
of the Criminal Code:
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(i) through the death of her full term foetus; and
(ii) through the physical consequences of unduly prolonged labour
and the Appellants' failed attempts to complete the birth.
PART m - ARGUMENT
A. INTERPRETATION OF SECTIONS 203 AND 204 OF THE CRIMINAL
CODE MUST BE GUIDED BY THE CHARTER'S GUARANTEES OF SEX
EQUALITY
(i) The Interpretation of the Legal Status of the Foetus and Legal
Treatment of Pregnant Women Raise Constitutional Sex Equality Issues
XI. LEAF invokes the Charter's sex equality guarantees in order that
they might shape the interpretation by this Honourable Court of the language
of sections 203 and 204 of the Criminal Code. Entailed in this focus on the
sex equality guarantees is a restoration of the pregnant woman to a central
place in the legal analysis. Resulting from such a focus, in LEAF's
submission, will be an interpretation of the Code, consistent with the Charter,
that furthers women's equality rather than entrenching inequality. Why such
an approach is necessary can be appreciated by considering what has happened
in this case to Jewel Voth herself.
XII. Jewel Voth desired a baby. She experienced pregnancy, a lengthy,
painful and wasted delivery, and anguish due to the loss of that expected baby.
Yet Jewel Voth has receded into the background of this case as legal issues
relating to the characterization of the foetus are defined and then debated. The
issues have been structured in a way that fails to place the pregnant woman,
in whose body a foetus is, at the centre of the legal analysis.
XIII. The legal status of the foetus-even of a full-term foetus-cannot
be addressed without addressing the legal status of the woman in whose body
it is. Similarly, analysis of bodily harm to a woman in the circumstances of
this case should not focus on what happened to the foetus disconnected from
the woman seeking to give birth.
XIV. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms addresses the legal
status of women in the following sections, among others:
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and
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the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice.
15.(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the
right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race,
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or
physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that
has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged
individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because
of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental
or physical disability.
28. Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and
freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and female
persons.
XV. This Honourable Court has given a purposive interpretation to
section 15, describing its purpose as the promotion of the equality of socially
disadvantaged groups. Through its use of examples, and its post-Charter
interpretation of human rights legislation, it has also recognized that women
are a group disadvantaged on the basis of sex.
Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 84,
at pp. 89-92 per LaForest, J.
Action Travail des Femmes v. C.N.R., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 114,
at pp. 1142-1145, per Dickson, C.J.C.
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R.
143, at pp. 170-175, per McIntyre, J.
Brooks v. Canada Safeway, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219, at pp. 1237-
1238; 1241-1250 per Dickson, C.J.C.
Janzen v. Platy Enterprises, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252, at pp.
1276-1282; 1284-1285 per Dickson, C.J.C.
R. v. Turpin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, at pp. 1330-1333, per
Wilson, J.
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XVI. In particular, this Court has recognized that woman have been
socially disadvantaged because they bear children. In the context of human
rights legislation, it has held that disadvantaging women on the basis of
pregnancy constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex.
Brooks, supra, paragraph 15
XVII. The Court's section 7 jurisprudence has supported a woman's
security of the person and liberty in the context of decisions about procreation.
R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at pp. 56-63; 73 per
Dickson, C.J.C. and pp. 171-173 per Wilson, J.
(ii) Development of Doctrine Concerning the Legal Relations of Woman
and Foetus Must Not Further Entrench Sex Inequality
XVIII. LEAF's approach to interpretation of sections 203 and 204
proceeds from the-recognition that pregnancies occur within a context of sex
inequality, an inequality which encompasses women's experiences of fertility
and infertility, conception and contraception, pregnancy and the end of
pregnancy, whether through miscarriage, abortion, or birth and child-rearing.
The point is not just the obvious one that only women directly experience
pregnancy and birth, but that it is women who because of their sex are
subjected to social inequality as a result of the whole range of experiences
around procreation.
XIX. Although reproduction has major consequences for both women and
men, its impact on women and men is not the same, because of the conditions
of social inequality within which women live and experience pregnancy and
childbirth. Women often do not control the social conditions under which they
become pregnant. The social context of sex inequality between men and
women often denies women control over the reproductive uses of their bodies
because it denies women control over sexual access to their bodies. Sexual
access is often forced or pressured. Frequently, contraception is inadequate
or unsafe and sex education misleading or unavailable. Poverty and enforced
economic dependence often undermine women's physical integrity and sexual
self-determination. It is not realistic to rely on the individual woman's sense
of self-respect as a bulwark against these life circumstances; social supports
for that self-respect are simply too frail.
Margrit Eichler, "Unmarried Parenthood", pp. 231-241 in
Families in Canada Today, 2d ed., Gage, Toronto, 1988
Equality Approach to Reproductive Choice
Catharine MacKinnon, "Rape: On Coercion and Consent", pp.
171-183; 295-299 in Toward a Feminist Theory of the State,
Harvard University Press, 1989
Linda MacLeod, Battered But Not Beaten (Canadian Advisory
Council on the Status of Women, 1987), pp. 3-7;19-30
Committee on Sexual Offences Against Children and Youth,
Report: Sexual Offences Against Children (Minister of Supply
& Services Canada, 1984), pp. 195-233
XX. Further, the social consequences both of being pregnant and of not
being pregnant are not controlled by women, whatever their age or social
station. Historically, women's role in childbearing has provided an occasion
for women's social disadvantage. Women's autonomy in making fertility
decisions has been affected by a number of outside influences, ranging from
government enforced sterilization to availability and management of programs
ostensibly intended to benefit the infertile. Decision-makers in health care and
government have left women little choice about the type of care they will
receive during pregnancy, who will attend them in childbirth and whether the
birth will be in hospital or not; social and economic supports for pregnant
women are often seriously inadequate.
Re Mabel P. French (1905), 37 N.B.R. 359, per Barker, J. at
p. 366 (N.B.S.C.)
E. (Mrs) v. Eve, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 388, at pp. 400-401; 418-
424; 427-430; 434, per LaForest, J.
Walker et al. v. Pierce, 560 F 2d. 609 (U.S.C.A., 4th Cir.,
1977)
Christine Overall, "Infertility", chapter 7 in Ethics and Human
Reproduction (Boston, Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp. 137-165
Task Force on the Implementation of Midwifery in Ontario,
Report (Toronto, Queen's Printer, 1987), pp. 69-70; 79-82
Murray Enkin et al., "Social, financial and psychological
support during pregnancy and childbirth", pp. 11-15 inA Guide
to Effective Care in Pregnancy and Childbirth, Oxford
University Press, 1989
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XXI. After birth, women are traditionally allocated primary responsibility
for the intimate care of children. However, women often do not control the
circumstances under which they rear children, because of poverty, inadequate
housing, lack of day care, and the structuring of the world of paid work on
the assumption that everyone in it-women included-has a life cycle like the
male's and the same freedom from child care responsibilities that has long
characterized male workers. In these circumstances, women certainly do not,
and cannot, control the impact which childrearing will have in their own lives.
Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, Women
and Labour Market Poverty (1990), pp. 7-35
National Council of Welfare, Report: Women and Poverty
Revisited (Minister of Supply & Services, Canada, 1990), pp.
38-83; 128-129
Margrit Eichler, "Types of Childcare Used", pp. 318-324 in
Families in Canada Today, supra, paragraph 19
Pat Armstrong, Labour Pains: Women's Work in Crisis
(Women's Press, 1984), pp. 19-21, 47
Linda MacLeod, Wife Battering in Canada (Minister of Supply
& Services Canada, 1980), pp. 29-31
XXII. By contrast, men are not comparably disempowered by society
through their reproductive capacities. No one forces them to impregnate
women or to bear children. They are not generally required by society to spend
their lives caring for children to the comparative preclusion of other life
pursuits.
XXIII. Thus, it is women who are caught, in varying degrees, between
the reproductive consequences of sexual use and aggression on the one side
and the economic and other consequences of the sex role allocations of labour
in the market and family on the other. Women are prevented from having
children they do want and forced to have children they do not want and cannot
want because they cannot responsibly care for them. LEAF submits that this
reality is best described as one of sex inequality.
XXIV. To say that women face sex inequality as a result of-and
in-their procreative functions is to acknowledge that in our society procreation
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is socially gendered. That is, differences between men and women exist, in
spite of the camouflaging effects of gender neutral language, and those
differences are socially constructed, not biologically determined. When a
teenager gets pregnant because of the negative social connotations associated
with contraception, it is a young woman who is pregnant. When miscarriage
results from physical assault it is a woman who was beaten. When there is not
enough money for another child, and no access to abortion, it is a woman who
is forced to have a child she cannot responsibly care for. When there is no
choice between a home and a hospital delivery, it is the labouring woman who
is forced to take risks she has not chosen either in hospital or at home. When
someone must care for the children, it is almost always women who do it,
without their work being valued either in terms of money or cultural status.
XXV. Establishing equality between the sexes in the reproductive sphere
would require reciprocity of respect, parity of regard for physical dignity and
personal integrity, shared work, and a mutuality of sexual initiative and control
over intimacy. To be able to realize these values, women need at least full
citizenship, nonimpoverishment, racial and cultural equality, and sexual self-
determination.
XXVI. A legal system committed to equality for women in the
reproductive sphere might well contain laws ensuring that pregnant women are
entitled to full information in order to enable them to make an informed choice
about a home or hospital birth. It might ensure that fully-trained midwives with
adequate support services are available, and that appropriate measures, short
of the criminal law, exist to ensure the professional competence of such
midwives. It is the result of the continued inequality of women in our society
that Jewel Voth had to make her decisions in this case without the benefit of
any such measures.
XXVII. Although paid considerable lip service, these values and goals
are not lived as social norms and only unevenly inform law. LEAF submits
that to be consistent with the Charter's mandate of sex equality in the
reproductive area, legal interpretation must be guided by these values and
goals, and may not further entrench social realities to the contrary.
Accordingly, LEAF urges that this Honourable Court adopt an interpretation
of the Criminal Code sections at issue here that will enhance women's equality
(rather than further entrench their inequality) by ensuring that the status of the
foetus is not considered apart from the woman who carries it.
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(iii) Development of Doctrine Concerning the Legal Relations of
Woman and Foetus, To Be Consistent with Charter Sex Equality
Guarantees, Must Take into Account the Experiences of Pregnant
Women
XXVmI. Because our legal system has been developed historically
almost entirely by men, without the presence of women as equal participants,
and in a society characterized by the subjection of women, it has tended to
view pregnancy from the standpoint of the outsider or observer rather than the
participant. While some of the approaches of that legal system, like the
conclusion that the foetus does not become a person until fully emerged in a
living state from the body of the woman, may coincide with the approaches
that might characterize a legal system and a society where women are equal
partners, the "outsider" perspective of our legal system has produced two
phenomena which are particularly troublesome in the context of this case. One
of these phenomena relates'to our method of legal reasoning-particularly
reasoning by analogy-and its ability fully to encompass the experience of
pregnancy. The second of these phenomena concerns the substantive treatment
of pregnancy and the foetus in our law. In this case, these two phenomena
intersect, providing a difficult challenge to our legal system and a serious
potential threat to women's equality rights.
XXIX. To describe the first of these phenomena, LEAF points out that
traditionally, legal method proceeds by analogy and distinction, making it
tempting to compare the relationship between a pregnant woman and her foetus
to relations already mapped by law. However, there are no adequate legal
analogies to pregnancy and childbirth and attempts to find them distort reality.
Had women not been excluded from participation in the legal system, the
unique relationship between the woman and her foetus and the experience of
pregnancy in the life of a woman-hardly new facts-might have engendered
their own fundamental legal concepts and doctrines, as elaborate as, for
example, the doctrines dealing with the legal relationship between partners in
a commercial venture or between employer and employee.
XXX. Recognizing these shortcomings in our method of conceptualizing
the legal relations of woman and foetus produces a method of analysis that
seeks to incorporate the perspective of women in the development of legal
doctrine relating to reproductive issues. Such a method is an analytical
approach consistent with equality as a goal of the legal system, because it
expands the point of view informing development of legal doctrine beyond the
outsider's perspective to include the perspective from the experience of women
(distinguished from the subjective perceptions of all women or any individual
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woman).
XXXI. This Court recognized the validity of approaching. the
elaboration of legal doctrine in a manner that recognizes the realities of
women's lives in R. v. Lavallee. That decision was based upon a recognition
that it is predominantly women who experience spousal abuse and that, in the
interests of equality, legal doctrine had to be made to respond to women's
experience of threats to life or health within the context of an abusive
relationship. It was not necessary to assume that all women shared these
experiences to conclude that the adaptation of legal doctrine was appropriate.
R. v. Lavallee (1990), 108 N.R. 321, at pp. 342-347 per
Wilson, J.
Tremblay v. Daigle, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530 at pp. 536-537
XXXII. Turning now to explore the impact of the outsider's perspective
on substantive law in this area, LEAF notes that the outsider standpoint has
led, especially in recent times, to a tendency to focus on observing and
controlling the pregnant woman in the interest-and the name-of her foetus.
Those sharing this focus have striven to give it legal shape, by urging that
courts intervene, on behalf of the foetus, in pregnancy and childbirth-and
even in the lives of non-pregnant, but fertile, women. Recent technological
innovations have fuelled the development of this phenomenon. For example,
ultrasound viewing of the foetus has provided the basis for seeing the foetus
as a free-floating independent entity, rather than situated within and
interconnected with the pregnant woman. Seeing a foetus from an outside
perspective, often opposed to the woman, rather than in terms of its
relationship with the pregnant woman, clearly poses grave risks to women's
equality and ultimately to the welfare of the foetus as well. It ignores the fact
that throughout history women have been the primary guardians of the welfare
of the foetus.
Anne Oakley "Getting to Know the Foetus", pp. 155-186 in
The Captured Womb: A History of the Medical Care of
Pregnant Women, Basil Blackwell, 1984, 1986
Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, "Foetal Images: the Power of
Visual Culture in the Politics of Reproduction", pp. 57-80 in
Michelle Stanworth, ed., Reproductive Technologies: Gender,
Motherhood and Medicine, U. of Minnesota Press 1987
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Isabel Grant, "Forced Obstetrical Intervention: A Charter
Analysis", (1989) 39 University of Toronto Law Journal 217
Edward Keyserlingk, "Clarifying the Right to Prenatal Care",
4 Health Law in Canada 36
Paragraph 40, infra
XXXIII. Positions adopted by others in this case reveal the influence
of both these results of the "outsider" perspective. The arguments of the
Appellants and the Intervener, R.E.A.L. Women, that the foetus is a separate
entity or a person, see the foetus as an entity independent of the pregnant
woman. At the other end of the continuum, to characterize the essence of
Court of Appeal's conclusion as a holding that the foetus is "simply a
disposable part of the woman's body", reveals the shortcomings of argument
by analogy in this area of the law, ignores the complexity and uniqueness of
the relations between a woman and her foetus, and submerges the woman's
experience of pregnancy.
Appellants' Factum, paras. 15, 29
XXXIV. By contrast, LEAF's argument focuses on the relationship
between a pregnant woman and her foetus, aims to grasp its uniqueness, and
situates pregnancy in the legal and social context of sex inequality in a way
that makes clear the relationship of this case to women's equality rights in the
reproductive area. To do so is essential because while the issues in this case
focus on the Criminal Code, the submissions of the parties to the two appeals
make it clear that any decision on whether the term "person" includes the child
in the process of birth, or whether a full-term foetus being born is part of the
woman giving birth, will have potentially far reaching implications for women,
both in jurisprudence under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and
in the law generally.
B. INTERPRETATION OF SECTIONS 203 AND 204 OF THE CRIMINAL
CODE
(a) The Foetus is Not a Person
XXXV. The foetus is not a person or any other kind of separate entity,
as has been recognized in our legal system. This conclusion is the only one
consistent with the equality of women as guaranteed by the Charter.
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XXXVI. The position in the case law that a foetus becomes a "person"
when it has fully emerged in a living state from the body of its mother is
consistent with adopting the perspective of the pregnant woman and with the
facts that the pregnancy is the woman's and the foetus stays in her body until
the point of completed live birth.
Reasons 'of the Court of Appeal, Appeal Case, pp. 54-56
Tremblay v. Daigle, supra, paragraph 31, at pp. 552-565; 567-
570
XXXVII. The selection of complete live birth as the time and place to
establish rights as a "person" is consistent with women's experience of
pregnancy and birth. While pregnant women may have different attitudes
toward the personhood of the embryo or foetus, depending on the particular
woman's religious beliefs, stage of the pregnancy, desire for the child, and
many other factors, and these views may change over the course of pregnancy,
the empirical reality of the fully emerged live child is something around which
all of these experiences can converge. As well, both the pregnant woman, who
has experienced the pregnancy as a process interior to her, and her partner,
for whom it has been an exterior process, begin at birth to share an exterior
perspective on the newborn child.
XXXVHI. Moreover, establishing the full emergence of the live
child as the beginning of personhood takes account of the fact that live birth,
even of the full-term foetus, is not inevitable. As Jewel Voth found to her
sorrow, the perils of the birth process, while now diminished through improved
maternal health, and availability of professional help, have not been removed
altogether.
XXXIX. LEAF adopts the submissions of the Crown as respondent in
its factum at paragraphs 25 to 27, and urges that this Honourable Court decline
to accept the positions advanced by R.E.A.L. Women and the Appellants,
which separate foetus and woman and could endow the foetus with an identity
and rights of its own.
Respondent's (Crown's) Factun, pp. 13-15
XL. A foetus so independently endowed is potentially capable, if only
through the interventions of others, of having legal relations with persons other
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than the pregnant woman (e.g. the father or a curator). The definition of its
interests by those others almost invariably brings them into conflict with the
rights and interest of the woman.
In reA.C. 573 A. 2d 1235 (D.C. App., 1990)
Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson,
201 A. 2d 537 (N.J.S.C., 1964)
Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority et al.,
274 S.E. 2d 457 (Ga. S.C., 1981)
Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E. 2d 395 (Mass., 1983)
In re Ruiz, 500 N.E. 2d 935 (Ohio C.A., 1986)
Cox v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 537 N.E. 2d 721
(Ohio C.A., 1988)
In re Troy D., a Minor, 215 Cal. App. 3d 889 (Calif. C.A.,
1990)
Paton v. British Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees, [1979]
Q.B. 276, affd at [1987] 1 All E.R. 1230 (sub. nom. C. v. S.)
and Paton v. United Kingdom (1980), 3 E.H.R.R. 408
Re F (in utero), [1988] 2 W.L.R. 1288 (C.A.)
Tremblay v. Daigle, supra, paragraph 31
Mack v. Brandenburg (1988), 61 Alta L.R. 236 (Q.B.)
Re Baby R. (1988), 15 R.F.L. (3d) 225 (B.C.S.C.)
Re Children's Aid Society of Belleville and T (1987), 59 O.R.
(2d) 204 (Ont. Prov. Ct. Fam. Div.)
Re Children's Aid Society for the District of Kenora and J.L.
(1981), 134 D.L.R. (3d) 249 (Ont. Prov. Ct. Fam. Div.)
XLI. Clothing the foetus with independent legal and constitutional rights
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may lead to the foetus having a right to the use of a woman's body, or a right
to medical treatment that overrides the welfare of the pregnant woman-rights
to be asserted over the woman by the putative father, a doctor, a self-appointed
foetal curator or an arm of the State. The approaches of both the Appellants
and the Intervener R.E.A.L. Women could lead to a legal analysis in which
the pregnant woman is treated as either not present at all (the "born in the
imagination" approach promoted by technological imaging of the foetus) or
simply present as a breeding container. Neither is consistent with equality for
women.
David R. Field, "Maternal Brain Death During Pregnancy:
Medical and Ethical Issues" (1988) 260 JAMA 816
(b) The Foetus Is In and Of the Pregnant Woman
XLII. For the purposes of section 204 of the Code, what is important is
that the foetus is in the woman's body. This is the case right up to the point
where the child has fully emerged in a living state from her body, as
recognized by section 206 (now 223) of the Code. Even a full-term foetus
whose head has been (in the words of the trial judge) "born", is still largely
in the woman's body.
XLIII. Not only is a foetus in the woman but it is also "of" her in that it
is interconnected with her in many intricate and intimate ways.
XLIV. While in and of the pregnant woman, the foetus is not just
another body part, as the Appellants characterize the Court of Appeal decision.
It is not analogous to an appendix, which is the Appellants' suggested
comparison. The foetus and the pregnancy are not even analogous to those
parts of the woman's body, like her breasts and vagina, which have specific
gender connotations. A sex equality perspective lets us see that what is a foetus
to others is lived by the pregnant woman through her pregnancy. Pregnancy
is not, in fact or in social meaning, like a "body part", even a female body
part. Pregnancy has many cultural meanings which have significant
consequences for women. It can be an emblem of female inferiority or
adulation, of elevation or denigration, of heightened or lowered social status.
It can bring pain or joy, fear or hope, dreams or dread of the future, and
closeness or estrangement between women and between women and men. It
can give a new sense of the meaning of life and new depth to the experience
of family. It can attract violence against the woman, sentimentality towards
her, and attempts to control her, and it can give rise to financial cost and
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disadvantage and the need for difficult decisions. Women have lost jobs and
have been stiginatized and excluded from publiclife because they are pregnant,
jobs and access they had in spite of being biological females. No body part,
not even one evidently emblematic of gender (like a breast), has the profound
and distinct effect on women's social destiny that pregnancy and the possibility
of pregnancy can have.
XLV. The intimate and complex connections between the pregnant woman
and her foetus are unique, and feature many ways in which the foetus is quite
unlike a body part. The foetus is ordinarily created through intercourse, a
social relation which has impregnation as a consequence. During pregnancy,
a woman experiences wide-ranging physiological changes that only .the
pregnancy initiates; without the foetus, they will not occur. From its outset,
the connection between the pregnant woman and her foetus is expected to end
and it inevitably does end, whether through spontaneous or planned abortion
or through birth. Further, the foetus carried to term involves the commitment
of almost one year of a woman's life to the creation of a child.
XLVI. Yet the foetus is deep within the body of a pregnant woman,
connected to many of her body's systems. The two are jointly nourished. There
is no access to the foetus except through the pregnant woman; whatever
happens to the foetus happens to the pregnant woman but not always in the
same way, and whatever happens to the pregnant woman happens to the foetus
but not always in the same way. Through her body, the pregnant woman
perceives and experiences the foetus in ways that no one else can duplicate;
she alone can witness the foetus and its development through her own senses
without the intermediation of technology.
XLVII. Viewing the foetus, either as a person or as a person-like
separate entity, or alternatively as just another body part of the pregnant
woman, does not capture the unique reality of pregnancy. These views
illustrate the limitations of attempting to conceptualize the foetus from an
outside perspective, which abstracts the foetus from its context, namely the
woman.
XLVIII. The reasons of the British Columbia Court of Appeal on this
point do not turn on a conclusion that the foetus is "simply a disposable part
of the woman's body". The Court of Appeal first concluded that the learned
trial judge had erred in holding that the foetus is the process of birth was a
"person" for the purposes of section 203 of the Criminal Code, given the clear
line of demarcation at live birth that had been established for centuries at
common law.
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Reasons of the Court of Appeal, Appeal Case, pp. 54-55
XLIX. The Court of Appeal said:
From the conclusion that the line of demarcation as a matter
of law is live birth, in our opinion, for the purposes of count
2, the child when it is in the birth canal remains part of the
mother, as a matter of law.
Appeal Case, p. 58
L. The conclusion of the Court of Appeal on this point is consistent with
the position argued by LEAF, although conceptually reached through a
different route. The Court held that as a matter of law, when there is harm
to a foetus which has not yet fully proceeded in a living state from a woman's
body there is bodily harm to the pregnant woman. On the facts of this case,
the Court of Appeal concluded that there was bodily harm to Jewel Voth.
LEAF submits that that conclusion was correct. Recognizing that the foetus
is in the woman's body and central to her pregnancy reveals that harm to a
full-term foetus in the process of birth is harm to the woman giving birth. The
interpretation of section 204 given by the Court of Appeal furthers the
purposes of sections 15, 7 and 28 of the Charter. The opposite interpretation
(namely, that when third party negligence harms a full-term foetus in the
process of birth there is not bodily harm to the pregnant woman) would work
against the purposes of those sections.
(c) Jewel Voth Suffered Bodily Harm
LI. LEAF submits that the issue of bodily harm to Jewel Voth should
be considered in light of this Honourable Court's observation that "The
importance of maintaining the physical integrity of a human being ranks high
in our scale of values, particularly as it affects the privilege of giving life".
Although stated in the context of a proposed involuntary sterilization, this
expression of values is quite appropriate in the context of the treatment during
labour of a pregnant woman.
E. (Mrs.) v. Eve, supra, paragraph 20, p. 434
LII. "Bodily harm" is not defined in the Criminal Code within the
context of causing bodily harm by criminal negligence (s.204), but rather in
the context of the assault offences. In that context it is defined as any hurt or
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injury to the complainant that interferes with the health or comfort of the
complainant and that is more than merely transient or trifling in nature.
Criminal Code, 1990, s. 267(2) as enacted by 1980-81-82-83,
c. 125, s. 19
LIII. This definition appears to have been adopted from the common law
definition of bodily harm:
Bodily harm has its ordinary meaning, and includes any hurt
or injury that interferes with the health or comfort of the
person. It is also referred to as such, (sic) hurt or injury need
not be permanent but must be more than merely transient and
trifling....
R. v. Maloney (1976), 28 C.C.C. (2d) 323, at p. 326, per
Lesage, Co.Ct.J.
LIV. Because the definition set out in s.267(2) evolved from the common
law, LEAF submits that it should not be confined to the assault offences, but
should also be used for purposes of determining criminal negligence causing
bodily harm within the meaning of s. 204.
R. v. Martineau, (S.C.C., September 13, 1990), Reasons of
Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dub6, p. 18
LV. The dictionary definition of "hurt" includes "damage", "harm",
"wrong", or "detriment". The definition of "injury" includes "hurt or loss
caused to or sustained by a person", as well as "harm", "detriment" and
"damage". "Bodily" is defined as including "of the nature of body",
"corporeal", "physical", "in the manner of, or with regard to, the body".
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1973, pp. 211, 999, 1075
LVI. LEAF submits that Jewel Voth sustained a hurt, harm or loss that
interfered with her health and comfort and was not merely transient and
trifling, within the meaning of section 204 of the Code.
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(i) Through the Death of Her Foetus Because it was In Her and of Her
LVII. Seeing harm to the full term foetus in the process of birth as bodily
harm to the birthing woman emphasizes the interconnected experience of the
woman and her foetus, and the high degree to which she remains physically
implicated especially at this late stage of pregnancy.
LVIII. The process of birth itself, like pregnancy, is something that
happens in and to the body of the woman. Each woman experiences it
profoundly and uniquely, her body systems functioning in complex ways to
deliver a baby into the world. Harm to the child being born is harm to the
woman in her experience of birth, and of birthing the foetus; it is harm to
something in her and of her in complex physiological and psychological senses.
As such it is harm to the woman, well within the definition of "bodily harm"
set out above at paragraphs 51 to 56.
LIX. Death of a foetus during birth is something that is uniquely
experienced by a pregnant woman. Failure of the state to recognize it as harm
is failure to recognize harm in a situation specific to women, and as such, is
a violation of women's equality rights.
Gillian Forrest, "Care of the Bereaved After Perinatal Death",
chapter 85 in Murray Enkin et al., eds., Effective Care in
Pregnancy and Childbirth (Oxford University Press, 1989), p.
1422
LX. Recognizing the woman as the harmed party for the purposes of
section 204 of the Code is consistent both with this Court's respect for bodily
integrity as it relates to procreation and with the Charter's sex equality
guarantees. It is also consistent with the right in section 7 of the Charter to
security of the person, a right extended equally to females and males by section
28. Such recognition is, moreover, in keeping with section 1 of the Charter.
Section 1 in and of itself does not create rights in the foetus. Moreover, the
section requires that the purpose and effect of legislation be tested against
fundamental democratic values, including equality. The interpretation of the
Code put forward by LEAF in this case advances the equality of women and
is therefore consistent with section 1 of the Charter.
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(ii) Physical Consequences of Prolonged Labour
LXI. A focus on the pregnant woman reveals another kind of bodily harm
within the meaning of section 204 of the Criminal Code. Jewel Voth suffered
bodily harm through the physical consequences of unduly prolonged labour and
the Appellants' failed attempts to complete the birth.
LXII. One of the bases for the trial judge's holding that the midwives were
guilty of criminal negligence causing death (of the foetus) was her finding that
in undertaking this birth, the midwives both failed to have and to use
reasonable knowledge, skill and care. She further found that the midwives
showed reckless disregard for the life and safety of the child in failing to
recognize the symptoms of exhaustion in the mother, the fever, the sunken
eyes, the volume depletion; and in "wasting precious time applying fundal
pressure to the mother's uterus, with the knowledge of potential harm to the
mother...".
Reasons, Appeal Case, pp. 29-30
LXIII. To acknowledge the suffering of Jewel Voth only in the context of
the harm to the full-term foetus, and not in the context of allegations that
bodily harm was caused to her, fails to recognize the significance to a woman
of that woman's suffering. Such an analysis is inconsistent with women's right
to equality before the law.
LXIV. Registering the fact that the injury and suffering of the woman
during a negligently conducted childbirth (both because of what happens to her
body during the process and because of its unhappy results) are the woman's
injury and suffering is to place the woman at the centre of the legal analysis,
where she belongs. It is also a fitting recognition of the fact that labour and
childbirth are, even now, perilous for the woman. Injury, and even death, have
not been banished from late twentieth century obstetrics.
[Vol. 4: 93
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PART IV - NATURE OF ORDER REQUESTED
LXV. For the foregoing reasons, LEAF asks that this Honourable Court
uphold the judgment of the Court of Appeal
ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
Mary Eberts
Lynn Smith
Of counsel for the intervener
Women's Legal Education and Action Fund
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
V. THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA DECISION IN R. V. SuLLIvAN
Giving brief Reasons, the Court allowed the appellants' appeal from their
conviction of criminal negligence causing bodily harm and dismissed the
Crown's appeal from the acquittal of criminal negligence causing death to a
person."5 Thus, Mary Sullivan and Gloria Lemay were discharged on all
counts.
The appellants' success in their appeal had nothing to do with the status
of the foetus nor with the legality of midwifery. Rather, their appeal succeeded
because the court of appeal had lacked jurisdiction to enter a conviction for
criminal negligence causing bodily harm when there had been an acquittal at
trial and no Crown appeal from that acquittal. Thus, procedurally there had
been no valid conviction on that count.
As for the Crown appeal from the court of appeal's acquittal on the charge
of criminal negligence causing death to a person, the Court held, on the basis
of textual analysis, that the long-established meaning of the word "person" was
not intended to be altered by the introduction of the criminal negligence
provisions. "Person," as used in section 203 of the Criminal Code, was
synonymous with the term "human being" defined in section 206 of the
Criminal Code.56 Lamer, C.J. for the majority of the Court concluded:
Therefore, according to s.206, the child of Jewel Voth was not a
"person" within the meaning of s.203 and Sullivan and Lemay cannot
be convicted of criminal negligence causing death to another person.
The intervener LEAF encouraged this court to find that a foetus is not
a "person" within the meaning of s.203 on the basis that such a result
would be inconsistent with the goal of sexual equality in the law which
has been recognized by this court in both Charter and non-Charter
cases.... Such an approach to statutory interpretation may have arisen
if an examination of the legislative history of the criminal negligence
provision had revealed that Parliament had intended that the term
"person" would include a foetus, whereas "human being" would not.
However, this was not the case. The result reached above is consistent
with the "equality approach" taken by LEAF, but it is unnecessary to
consider this point in further detail."
55. R. v. Sullivan, 63 C.C.C.3d 97 (1991) (Can.). Madam Justice Claire L'Heureux-DubM dissented
in part, stating that she would have dismissed the appellant's appeal. Id. at 109.
56. Id. at 106.
57. Id. at 106-7 (citations omitted).
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An issue arose during the hearing that tested the equality approach from
a different angle and led to an interesting passage in the Court's Reasons. It
was the question of liability in tort for causing a pregnant woman to lose her
foetus. In Canadian law, unless the foetus is born alive there is no cause of
action for what might have happened to it in utero. Harm to the foetus in utero
is not even seen as harm to the pregnant woman. However, if a child is born
alive, a cause of action may be maintained on its behalf for personal injuries
suffered before birth.s Thus; when a question came up at the hearing about
tort law and harm to the foetus in utero, exploration of the issue revealed how
the law (both criminal and civil) fails to recognize the harm to a woman
resulting from such injuries and fails to allow compensation for these injuries.
Yet why should the law not recognize the loss of a foetus as harm to a
pregnant woman?
In developing the Sullivan argument, the LEAF working group spent much
time thinking about whether or not what happened to Jewel Voth was bodily
harm within the Criminal Code definition. Even leaving aside Ms. Voth's
greatly prolonged labour and bruising, there was the loss of her full-term
foetus. That looked a lot like bodily harm-yet it was not seen as such in law.
As a result, LEAF's position was that, assuming the trial judge was correct
in finding clear negligence on part of the accused, the conviction for criminal
negligence causing bodily harm to Ms. Voth was correct. Similarly, harm to
a pregnant woman's foetus should be recognized as a civil wrong. Such
recognition need not stem from any primitive view of the foetus as a body part,
nor from the conferral of legal personhood on the foetus, but from a view that
women who are pregnant and injured by another such that they lose their
foetuses suffer an actual, real and compensable loss.59
The Reasons of the Supreme Court on this issue are somewhat oblique. In
discussing why the court of appeal could not substitute a conviction for an
acquittal on the criminal negligence causing bodily harm charge, the Court said
the following:
I respectfully disagree with the Crown's assertion that Sullivan and
Lemay could not have been convicted on both counts in this case. The
58. See Duval v. Seguin, 26 D.L.R.3d 418 (Ont. H.C. 1972), aff'd, 40 D.L.R.3d 666 (Ont. C.A
1973); Wipfli v. Britten, 13 D.L.R.4th 169 (B.C.C.A. 1984), leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted January
31, 1985, notice of discontinuance filed August 13, 1987.
59. In effect, just as the Supreme Court of Canada had corrected for male bias in the law in some
previous cases, so it could correct for such bias in the law relating to bodily harm. Previous examples of
such cases include R. v. Lavallee, [19901 1 S.C.R. 852 (law of self defence re-evaluated, permitting a
woman charged with the murder of her common-law spouse to present evidence that she had lived in an
abusive relationship such that she had acted in self defence despite the fact that she was not at imminent
risk of harm at the moment she pulled the trigger) and Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd., [19891 1 S.C.R.
1219 (prohibition against "sex discrimination" in employment held to include discrimination based on
pregnancy).
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trial judge explicitly considered whether Jewel Voth had suffered bodily
harm (independent of the death of the foetus) and concluded that she
had not. Had the trial judge made a different finding of fact, she may
well have convicted Sullivan and Lemay on both counts. Furthermore,
even if no independent bodily harm was found to have occurred, it
would still not be impossible for Sullivan and Lemay to have been
convicted on both counts. It would not have been illogical to find that
bodily harm was done to Jewel Voth through the death of the foetus
which was inside of and connected to her body and, at the same time,
to find that the foetus was a person who could be the victim of criminal
negligence causing death.60
As may be seen, some language with echoes of the LEAF factum ("bodily
harm was done to Jewel Voth through the death of the foetus which was inside
of and connected to her body" 61) found its way into the judgment in this
context. The Court clearly leaves open the possibility, without deciding, that
harm to a pregnant woman's foetus is harm to her.
In addition, the Court's confirmation that personhood begins at live birth
was important since Tremblay v. Daigle62 had not involved interpretation of
the Criminal Code sections at issue here. The decision makes it much more
unlikely that attempts such as those in "Baby R" (Re)63 to control pregnant
women's conduct will be successful. And the Court's reference to LEAF's
equality approach, although it does not amount to an endorsement, treats the
approach as a credible possibility. It is for those well-versed in the United
States jurisprudence, and not myself, to consider whether a comparable
approach might be worthwhile in the context of a very different set of
constitutional guarantees and socio-political circumstances.6
In short, what the Court says about the reproductive rights issues in
Sullivan is consistent with the direction to which an equality approach points,
even though other directions are not yet foreclosed. The LEAF intervention,
and the process that led to it, were clearly worthwhile for that reason. In
addition, the work on the case undoubtedly changed our own views and
advanced our analysis in ways no academic exercise could ever have done.
60. Sullivan, 63 C.C.C.3d at 108-9.
61. Id.
62. 62 D.L.R.4th 634 (1989).
63. 53 D.L.R.4th 69 (B.C.S.C. 1988), supra note 38 and accompanying text.
64. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281
(1991); Ruth Colker, An Equal Protection Analysis of United States Reproductive Health Policy: Gender,
Race, Age and Class, 1991 DUKE L.J. 324; Fran Olsen, Comment: Unraveling Compromise (The Supreme
Court 1988 Term), 103 HARV L. REV. 105 (1989).
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